Reconstructing the Backstory:America, Russia, and the Cold War

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Walter LaFeber's imagination and ambition were fired by a brief comment George F. Kennan made in the early 1960s, deploring

Second, the four decades between the first and the final editions span most of LaFeber's career, making the book a running commentary on his evolution as a historian and witness to a changing world. Third, reflecting the global and frequently all-consuming nature of the Cold War for international and American politics alike, America, Russia and the Cold War shines also as a concise history of US foreign relations in the six decades after 1945. The volume's "revisionist" interpretation stresses, especially in its first chapters, the

of the New Left, “revisionist” view of US foreign relations history. Though the so-called Wisconsin interpretation appealed to LaFeber, he also maintained his independence from it, as he

Sincerely generous with his time and his attention, it was difficult to perceive that he was also smoothly setting the parameters of such interactions. If one ventured too far into LaFeber's domain by suggesting what he might do, or even by asking what he was doing or how he was feeling, the intruder might well encounter a polite but definite drawing of the curtain as he adroitly shifted attention back to his inquisitor. Most interlocutors, flattered by the attention, failed to notice the move. LaFeber remained, in this sense, the observer, a participant who remained the observer. Perhaps owing to his being an only child, he felt most comfortable with singular action in which he retained the options.

Fred Harvey Harrington

LaFeber's inherent reserve militated against unrestrained feelings for anyone outside his family, but he made a near exception for his graduate school adviser. Fred Harvey Harrington employed a firm hand in directing his graduate seminars at Wisconsin, and decades later, LaFeber was still struck by the force of his mentor's personality and intellect. He stressed Harrington's "dominant voice" in the national university community, his "arresting presence," and his "energy-charged style."[4] A Harrington visit late in his life to Cornell, which included an appearance in LaFeber's senior seminar, revealed something he intimidated undergraduates could not imagine on their esteemed professor's face: the concern of a student still eager, after so many years, to impress his teacher anew.

Harrington inspired LaFeber's scholarship, including aspects of

and, perhaps above all, to deal with the roots, transformations, and effects" of American dominance in world affairs. In describing what Harrington insisted his graduate students do, LaFeber also summed up his own approach to America, Russia, and the Cold War as well as to his other books.[5] "Through it all," LaFeber stressed, "one consistent theme reappeared apart from the manner. That theme was the influence of [Charles A.] Beard, and the understanding and sensitivity with which Harrington and other Wisconsin faculty used Beard's work."[6] Beard, the preeminent Progressive historian in the years leading up to World War II, challenged the unequal distribution of wealth and power in America while emphasizing democracy's ever-present need for reinvigoration. He famously stressed the importance of economic interest among the architects of the US Constitution in the 1780s, for example, and the continued influence of self-interest of wielders of national power since.

Harrington challenged graduate students with a Beardian critique: "Where's the economics in your story?"[7] There certainly was economics aplenty in LaFeber's histories. Moreover, every edition of America, Russia, and the Cold War retained two paragraphs that, seemingly more attuned to historiographical loyalty than to Cold War history, defended Beard against such apologists for empire as the Harvard historian Samuel Eliot Morison.[8] Reluctant to embrace radical new ideological constructs both as a student then as a professor himself, LaFeber nonetheless ensured that more radical authors, like Beard and then Williams as well, received the respectful forum their ideas deserved.

William Appleman Williams – and George F.Kennan

Williams too stressed economic motivations in his histories of US foreign policy since 1890, arguing that Washington's primary aim was to expand and sustain an Open Door empire

that enabled the United States to export industrial and agricultural products that could not be consumed at home. Harrington thoroughly approved and "handpicked" his PhD student to return to Wisconsin when a new slot on its faculty opened.[9] Williams' reputation preceded him. LaFeber had already read the iconoclast

Although LaFeber learned from Williams and Harrington, he was not their acolyte. Invariably polite and habitually discreet, he often glossed over differences with those whom he respected. Nevertheless, he emphasized that "Harrington's personal ideology framed as much more by Beardian categories than by any New Left."[11] That distinction also applied to LaFeber himself, who maintained a respectful distance from Williams' broadest conclusions. It seems to have stemmed from a mix of personality and politics. LaFeber's personal copy of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy bore this inscription from Williams: "Don't frown so, Walt, this doesn't mean we have to have socialism."[12] Many years later, Gardner would recall a strain in some conversations with their mentor long after the trio graduated. Sometime "if we were all together with Bill, and a discussion took place, Walt and Tom clammed up and I was left to debate Bill. I guess they felt it wasn't worth it, or that I was the one who had worked with him, so it was my job to mount the challenges."[13]

Some of those challenges centered on the history of U.S. relations with Russia. One way to contextualize America, Russia, and the Cold War is to bring a key assumption of LaFeber's – the Cold War's near inevitability – into conversation with conclusions reached by Harrington, Williams, and Kennan. Whether serious conflict between America and Russia was avoidable remains the overriding question in the relations between these two giants since 1890. Could alternative paths chosen at critical historical junctures have circumvented most Cold War tensions? Was it possible for American leaders to work out a deal with Bolshevik Russia at the time of the Revolution? Was there a significant chance, as Franklin D. Roosevelt hoped, for postwar collaboration with Moscow after their wartime alliance of necessity? Did Josef Stalin's death, to borrow the title of Dwight D. Eisenhower's speech at the time, provide "a chance for peace"? Did Russia's experiment with democracy in the 1990s constitute a missed chance for

closer ties? In the final analysis, is the history of U.S.-Russian relations more a tale of natural enemies or of botched opportunities?

Ultimately unanswerable, these questions nonetheless offer a framework for comparing the underlying ideas, assumptions, and wishes of these four historians. The conversation requires juxtaposing two challenges: first, the possibility of American representatives striking a deal with the new Bolshevik regime in 1918, and, second, the possibility of a mutual accord in 1945. While imperfect, the analogy between these moments is revealing. At each critical juncture the Communists in Russia desired U.S. resources to rebuild their war-shattered country, and signaled a willingness to moderate their aims if such aid were forthcoming. While some key Americans favored pursuing possible deals, each potential accord ultimately fell prey to standing resentments.

In this context, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, especially in its earlier editions, is itself contained by the Cold War. Despite its revisionist stance, the book remained bounded by the assumptions prevailing in Amer (onsTl)-2 (f)i ls9he conflict. Was conflict with Russia inevitable? LaFeber answers with a firm yes. The first sentence of the firs ediion reads: “I was OTlober 1945 and war had ever ended.” The book goes on: “The ew issue of Russia’s leading doctrinal jo2 (s)-1nal, Bol’shevik, warned that . . . he ‘

and Washington's aspiration for an open door world made struggle between them, a cold war, unavoidable. The introduction to the tenth edition, reviewing U.S.-Russian tensions since the late 19th century, concludes that the two nations "finally became partners because of a shotgun marriage forced upon them by World War II." Yet, as the opening line of the ensuing chapter makes plain: "A honeymoon never occurred."[15]

The message changed little over the course of forty years, nor did the implied weight of responsibility for the Cold War that ensued: The United States had given the Soviet Union $11 billion worth of materiel during the war and expected a return on its investment in the form of greater cooperation and an open door to Moscow's empire in Eastern Europe. Wary of repeated invasions from the West, the Soviets desired instead a buffer between themselves and the American-led capitalist world, and believed they had already paid their wartime debt in full. It cost 25 million Soviet lives to defeat the Nazis. American dead totaled only 420,000.

Although Roosevelt dominated U.S. foreign policy during the war, LaFeber painted a broader canvas of American designs by focusing on the efforts of lower-level officials to set up an open world order friendly to American exports. He does not mention the 1943 Tehran summit at which Roosevelt and Stalin hammered out differences and outlined postwar settlements, for instance. Missing also is Roosevelt's alerting Averell Harriman (the American ambassador in Moscow) of his conclusion that postwar Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was inevitable no matter how deft his personal diplomacy, at least during a postwar transition. LaFeber thought otherwise, however, remaining skeptical that Rooseveltian magic could somehow bridge the chasm separating capitalists from communists.

Both sides may have feared the other too much for such accord. Quoting Louis Halle, the ranking member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, LaFeber told readers that "The

papers to the graduate student. That infuriated Kennan, who soon thereafter launched his own book project on U.S.-Russian relations during the Bolshevik Revolution. With limited access to the papers of Robins, Kennan accorded him only limited attention in his 1956 book.

recognizing how much Truman had repudiated Roosevelt's efforts to get along with Stalin. Moreover, while emphasizing the importance of America's quest for an open door world at the onset of the Cold War, LaFeber had, Bernstein argued, largely dropped this emphasis in subsequent chapters of the book.[20] This was a keen distinction that persisted through all ten editions. The emphasis on economic causation in the first part of the book did indeed fade in later chapters. A side note of possible significance is that when Bernstein's self-consciously "New Left" field-shaping book of "revisionist" essays, Towards a New Past, appeared in 1968, it included a chapter by Lloyd Gardner but not one by LaFeber. Perhaps his absence should not surprise.[21] LaFeber always resisted being pigeonholed, even with friends and colleagues whose viewpoints he largely shared.

America, Russia, and the Cold War appealed to readers not only for its revisionist thesis and plethora of facts, but also for its readability. LaFeber emphasized the "direct and sharp" sentences he had learned to write from Harrington with the kind of pungent quotations and memorable metaphors that enabled Thomas A. Bailey, his M.A. adviser at Stanford, to write such popular textbooks.[22] LaFeber paid specia. onTd [(Af31-0.adas a)-1 01 Tw [(eb)l>2t 0 Td (4s a)-1 01

LaFeber also infused his writing, like his lectures, with a sense that was something

moment in American society. Amidst the turbulence of the post-World War II period and the tensions of the Cold War, verities endured. That was not as obvious a conclusion within the profession as one might think.

Carl L. Becker

LaFeber's firm belief in the fundamental difference between fact and fiction is reflected in a revealing challenge he posed to his hallowed predecessor at Cornell, Becker, another University of Wisconsin PhD and student of famed historian Frederick Jackson Turner. LaFeber revered Becker for resolutely "thinking otherwise," for his association with Beard and other Progressive historians, and for a devotion to Cornell that matched his own. That Harrington had worked with Becker at Cornell no doubt had heightened LaFeber's satisfaction in 1959 at snaring a plum position where Becker had strode the Arts Quad.

LaFeber underscored his connection to this predecessor in his copy of Becker's collection of essays, Everyman His Own Historian.[29] In this volume, as in most of his personal books, LaFeber penned his signature on the first page, typically with a single line scrawled under his name. His copy of Becker's essays, however, seemed to emphasize the owner's possession with four strokes of the pen. This was his book, and he probably wanted to think of himself as an inheritor of Becker's tradition.

All the more significant, then, that LaFeber differed so sh(t)-2 (L)128 pTw [(h)1 (i)41 (d s) (d s (

explained, “is a once valid but now discarded version of the human past, as our now valid versions will in due course be relegated to the category of discarded myths.” To which LaFeber queried on the margin “Myth is History?”[30] Reading through this famous essay, probably preparing a lecture for a Cornell audience, LaFeber signaled further linkage to Becker by inking an addition to the title. It now read, “Everyman His Own & Our Own Historian.”[31]

Affinity for Becker did not obviate LaFeber’s alarm. Progressing further into Becker’s essay, his question marks grew in size, and he pressed the fountain pen harder to the page. He scrawled the largest question mark to the right of a passage that he also underlined and set off with a vertical line. Sparking this concern was Becker’s assertion, “The facts do not speak: left to themselves they do not exist, not really, since for all practical purposes there is no fact until someone affirms it.”[32]

LaFeber’s longest penned comment responded to Becker’s eerily prescient proto-post-truth populism. LaFeber underscored the words of Becker printed in italics. “Berate him as we will for not reading our books, Mr. Everyman is stronger than we are, and sooner or later we must adapt our knowledge to his necessities. Otherwise he will leave us to . . . cultivate a species of dry professional arrogance growing out of the thin soil of antiquarian research.” In Becker’s view the stories Americans tell about themselves must prove useful, regardless of where the facts might lead, or they would be discarded by the bulk of the population not just as history but as lies.

LaFeber would have none of this. He squeezed into the book’s margin a concern that speaks to the challenges faced by scholars in the third decade of the twenty-first century: “This is close to saying that history must be written according to the Will of the Majority or the strongest interest groups. If the latter, Becker’s Liberalism is open to question. If the former or

latter, his History is so opened.” Four additional strokes of the fountain pen underscored his critique.

restraining the marketplace remained an article of faith for LaFeber, while the notion that economic power itself could be both liberating and limiting can be seen in his ongoing reassessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. and Soviet economies. In later editions of America, Russia, and the Cold War,

emphasized the difficulty of fitting his analysis of 1945-56 into the page limit allowed by the publisher. Time only tightened the squeeze for later editions. The first's 259 pages allotted twelve pages per year. By the tenth edition, the book had grown to 450 pages, yet had to cover sixty-one years, permitting only seven pages per year. Later editions packed more words onto each page, and even the paper grew thinner. Yet even with space at such a premium, LaFeber retained the sections on Niebuhr. Indeed, they grew, and the repeated summoning of Niebuhr in the conclusions of all the editions of the volume testify to this deepest of influences.

Niebuhr also helps explain the book's appeal to readers. What LaFeber launched in 1967 as a study of U.S.-Russian relations in their larger context expanded into a textbook on U.S. relations with the rest of the world. LaFeber managed to include numerous important global developments while maintaining his readable narrative. The basic, simple story line of America, Russia, and the Cold War comes straight out of Niebuhr: Emerging from World War II as the most powerful nation in history, the United States spent decades dissipating its power in unwise foreign adventures while neglecting mounting problems at home.

"Not since Jonathan Edwards' day of the 1740s, had an American theologian so affected his society," wrote LaFeber about the onset of the Cold War. Like Edwards, "Niebuhr emphasized the role of sin and sinful power in that society." Humans' birthright of sin burdened them with avarice, selfishness, and an inability to realize the limits of their own power. These weaknesses led to anxieties and an inability to use freedom constructively. Such emotional reactions engendered a will-to-power and, inevitably, conflict. Given these dangerous aspects of human nature, reason and even science were easily corrupted and blind to their limits. Underscoring the importance of a liberal arts education, LaFeber, echoing Niebuhr, warned that

science “often refused to use the religious and historical insights required to solve secular problems.”[48]

All this, Niebuhr argued, made communism especially dangerous. That ideology’s true believers failed to perceive that while mankind enjoyed only a limited capacity for good, it suffered an almost limitless inclination to perpetrate evil in the name of good. Hence the United States had to contain Soviet Russia, as Kennan had urged in 1946-47. Niebuhr, LaFeber explained, “provided a historical basis and rationale for the tone, the outlook, the unsaid, and often unconscious assumptions of this period.”[49] In laying out Niebuhr’s foreign policy recommendations in 1946-47 – Cold War policies that included opposing the Soviet Union, rebuilding Germany and Western Europe, and integrating an economic, political, and military Atlantic community led by Washington – LaFeber’s language signaled little space between the theologian’s ideas and his own. Left unquestioned by either Niebuhr or LaFeber was whether a lasting breach with the Soviet Union was the necessary and best course.

In his discussion of the domestically divisive Korean War, LaFeber cited Niebuhr’s warning that only a half-decade into the Cold War, Americans were already losing their sense of limits. They were also trusting too much in economic growth and scientific advances to solve basic moral and political problems. LaFeber approvingly cited Niebuhr’s quoting John Adams: “‘Power always thinks it has a great soul and vast views beyond the comprehension of the weak; and that it is doing God’s se

accurately, its principal adversary had collapsed. Yet it remained unclear how the United States should deploy its enormous power to better either the nation or the world. Pursuit of the Open Door throughout the 20th century contributed to conflict. Such was the case, again, after 1991. To be fair, LaFeber's caution when composing the most recent editions may reflect the heightened prudence of a mature historian faced with a paucity of archival records. Still, the final editions of America, Russia, and the Cold War offer almost as many questions as answers, inserting hints of ambivalence even in moments of apparent American triumph. George H.W. "Bush's inability to take advantage of the Soviet opportunities" as the Cold War waned "was not because of America's public opinion," he wrote of the transition period between Gorbachev's inadvertent dissolution of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin's bold creation of its Russian successor.[51]

"Perhaps the President's great caution was caused by the inability of himself and his top advisers," he wrote more than a decade after the events he described, "all of whom had grown up in the Cold War, to imagine a world without the Soviets or a Cold War." The tone differed sharply from the bold assertiveness of earlier editions. "Perhaps it was because Bush, Cheney, Baker, and Scowcroft had all been involved with Gerald Ford in 1976 when détente turned sour and Ford went down to defeat in the presidential election," he surmised. "Perhaps it was due to the administration's fear that if Yeltsin won, the Soviet Union could become so chaotic as to present new dangers."[52]

Perhaps indeed. The word signifies caution, antidote to the hubris that both Niebuhr and LaFeber feared. As the final editions of the book detailed, Presidents H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and G. W. Bush each tried to impose order on Russian-American relations after the Soviet Union's collapse. In part because of external factors, but also in part due to their own over-

corresponded with Daniel Fried, a career diplomat then on the staff of the National Security Council. He concluded from this conversation that “oil is of course front and center in the whole thing, although one would never know it from the NY Times, Washington Post, or the Bush administration.”[55]

More than memories of Bailey Hall lectures sustained such valued relationships. A dedicated correspondent, LaFeber wrote long, single-spaced letters and, later, emails to a wide variety of acquaintances and friends. Former undergraduate David Maisel ’68 regularly sent brief

Skepticism over his former student's role in forging national policy, however, soon morphed into pride. By the time of the 2002 edition of America, Russia, and the Cold War, Kosovars were free from Serbian domination, and LaFeber in turn praised Berger for having spurred Clinton's pledge not to deploy ground troops to bolster the air war.[57] Ever cautious about the use of force in foreign relations, LaFeber was relieved that his student had, at last, imbibed the virtue of restraint. "Stories circulated that Clinton, who had an explosive temper, had privately berated Berger for his advice," LaFeber wrote. "The President should have thanked him."[58]

Clinton's international problems paled in comparison to the world his successor confronted after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. George W. Bush launched a global war on terror in response, which ultimately included an invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, something policymakers a decade before had assiduously avoided during their own conflict in the volatile Persian Gulf. This new generation of leaders believed their nation's exceptional power could overcome historic ethnic and religious divisions within the conquered country, and furthermore believed it possible in the Cold War's wake to export American-style democracy at gunpoint. LaFeber wasn't surprised. Niebuhr had warned of the hubris that stems from power, especially when multiplied by fear and uncertainty. "As world affairs became less predictable after 1989-1991," LaFeber concluded, "Americans continued to rely on their military superiority to deal with much of the unpredictability."[59]

Washington's post-9/11 policies eventually buckled under their own contradictions, dissipating American power and international prestige in the process, leaving LaFeber distressed, albeit largely in private. After President Bush on March 19, 2003 announced the forceful overthrow of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, veteran newsman Jim Lehrer invited LaFeber to discuss the war on PBS Newshour, yet he refused this and other such requests. "I do not want publicly to

say how I really feel about current policy," he confided to a friend on March 23, but "the more I see of what is going on the angrier I'm becoming. Something has gone really wrong."[60] His 10th and final edition of America, Russia, and the Cold War carried the story through 2006, albeit with a tie back to a seminal moment in American internationalism. Woodrow Wilson had failed to 'make the world safe for democracy' (as he famously phrased it) and "had died broken an embittered." Bush was no less a Wilsonian, equally convinced principles could repair a broken world while building a better one in its place. Bush "emphasized an American mission to create new democracies" as well, LaFeber ultimately concluded, and in doing so "appeared to be a reincarnation of the Woodrow Wilson from nearly a century earlier."[61]

Although LaFeber never grew nostalgic for the Cold War, he ultimately came to appreciate aspects of its certainty. He mused that "it well might be the only way the US can exercise its power in complicated global situations is by telling Americans they have to join a 'crusade,' as Harry Truman did in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. … Otherwise, Americans are great, as someone recently noted, at both globalizing business and damaging it at the same time."[62] The irony was that crusades easily mutated into disasters, especially if leaders tried to spread democracy in countries unprepared for it, such as Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. In the final edition of America, Russia, and the Cold War, LaFeber added a long chapter to explain "The World Turned Upside Down 2001-2006." His tone was coolly analytical as he laid out all the mistakes made by US leaders after 9/11. Privately, however, he flashed anger. In Iraq, Bush and Rice "don't have a clue as to what is happening," while "Czar Vlad I in Russia [is] systematically eliminating all opposition while we continue to support him." Meanwhile, "the Democrats carry out their plans to execute Bush by firing while standing in their own circle. What a bunch of losers."[63] Foolishness, like tyranny, "is rooted in a human

nature that cannot be changed, only aimed," LaFeber believed.[64] Hence the importance of Niebuhr's emphasis on limiting both concentrated power and confidence in such might.

Such limits were missing in the curriculum at some key universities, LaFeber remarked in a mostly serious tone. "There really is an arrogance that Yale instills that condemns its students to intellectual unreality -even much more so than Harvard- and as I've told Harvard students in my office, Harvard's most important gifts to the world have been the Vietnam War and the Unibomber. Yale's are the Iraqi/Afghanistan catastrophes and John Kerry."[65]

An emphasis on the importance of limits infused both LaFeber's decades of teaching at Cornell and his dedication to updating America, Russia, and the Cold War. The single most telling fact about LaFeber's forty-year odyssey with that book is that he concluded every edition the same way: with Niebuhr. Moreover, from the second edition to the last, he couched the warning against overweening power and unceasing conflict in terms of a somewhat obscure formulation that evidently appealed to him. Niebuhr had unearthed from Romans 7 the passage, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and making me captive to the law of sin being in my members." Both Niebuhr and LaFeber interpreted this dichotomy in terms of the Cold War. They viewed the "sin" of the "law in my members," that is, the weakness and inclination toward evil of the body, as referring to the militarized rivalry that characterized the Cold War, as well as the hard line, "realist" policies of Washington and Moscow in waging the struggle. In this polarity, the law of the mind and of God figured as negotiation and compromise.

Although a cold war between America and Russia was flaring up again in the early 2000s, LaFeber in the last paragraph of the final edition of America, Russia, and the Cold War sought to inject restraint into that rivalry by enlisting the last leader of the Soviet Union as a

Niebuhrian. He quoted Mikhail Gorbachev, who in 1992 had spoken at the same forum where

Endnotes

[1] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), vii. LaFeber most likely made this comment in 1963 or 1964, following publication of his first monograph, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).

[2] Sandra LaFeber email to Frank Costigliola, August 1, 2022.

[3] Becker's own view on the question of academic engagement with society and contemporary affairs, discussed below, mutated during World War I. Critical of Becker's lackluster opposition to the growing Nazi threat in the 1930s, LaFeber nonetheless found classroom inspiration in the ideal of thinking "otherwise." It was, he argued, the ideal way to learn. "One of the things that should happen here [Cornell] is that you're opened up to other perspectives, and you should be challenged," he told students in 2010. "It doesn't mean you change. What it should be is that if you are right, your reasoning should be reinforced… That's one of the purposes of Cornell, to throw out these kinds of challenges to people, take positions and argue about them." Jenny Proctor, "One Role of a Professor is to Think "Otherwise," says LaFeber," *Cornell Chronicle*, October 18, 2010.

[4] Walter LaFeber, "Fred Harvey Harrington, Teacher and Friend," in *Behind the Throne Servants of Power to Imperial President, 1898-1968*, ed. Thomas J. McCormick and Walter LaFeber (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 3.

[5] LaFeber, "Harrington," 3.

[6] LaFeber, "Harrington," 16.

[7] Lloyd C. Gardner to Frank Costigliola email, August 11, 2022.

[17] William Appleman Williams, *American Russian Relations 1781-1947* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952), 142.

[18] George F. Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 64, fn44.

[19] Fred Harvey Harrington, review of Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War*, *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 44 (June 1957): 165-66. Kennan also believed that there had been a chance for Robins to strike a deal—that is, if Robins had possessed the knowledge of Russian language and history, the diplomatic expertise, and the familiarity with Marxist ideology that Kennan himself commanded. See Costigliola, foreword to Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023), xi.

[20] George C. Herring, Jr. review in *The Journal of American History* 56 (June 1969): 184-65; Barton J. Bernstein, review in *The American Historical Review* 74 (October 1968): 113-14.

[21] Barton J. Bernstein, *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (NY: Pantheon, 1968).

[22] LaFeber, "Harrington," 8.

[23] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*, 157.

[24] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 257.

[25] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 373.

[26] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 384.

[27] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 330.

[28] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 346.

[29] *Everyman His Own Historian: Essays on History and Politics*, ed. Carl L. Becker (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc, 1935.

[30] Becker, *Everyman*, 247.

[31] Becker, *Everyman*, 233.

[32] Becker, *Everyman*, 251.

[33] Becker, *Everyman* 252.

[34] LaFeber, "Carl Becker's Histories and the American Present," *Era* 1, 4 (Fall 2011), 7, 9.

[35] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952).

[36] Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, vii-viii.

[37] Richard Wightman Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr A Biography* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).

[38] Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, 40.

[39] Niebuhr,*Irony of American History*, 149.

[40] Niebuhr,*Irony of American History*, 156.

[41] Fox,*Niebuhr*, 286.

[42] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*(New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

[43] Fox,*Niebuhr*, 245.

[44] LaFeber,*America, Russia, and .4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4 55h.4W55h.4 55h.4Ci7(n)7 (lo)*

[63] LaFeber to Maisel, January 4, 2004, Maisel papers.

[64] *Cornell Alumni Magazine*, May/June 2006, p. 41.

[65] LaFeber email to David Maisel, January 7, 2008, Maisel papers.

[66] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 450.